



Version of attached le:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached le:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Langford, N.J. (2019) 'The Governance of Social Standards in Emerging Markets: An exploration of actors
and interests shaping Trustea as a Southern multi-stakeholder initiative.', Geoforum, 104 . pp. 81-91.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.06.009
Publisher's copyright statement:




The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom




The Governance of Social Standards in Emerging Markets: An exploration of actors and 
interests shaping Trustea as a Southern multi-stakeholder initiative   
Abstract 
Exploitative and inadequate working conditions in developing countries remain a pressing concern in 
an age of advanced globalisation. As a response to weak regulatory environments, multi-stakeholder 
initiatives (MSIs) have emerged as a key institution of regulatory governance within globalised 
production networks. While MSIs governing social standards for workers and producers in North-
South trade are well-established, the rapid growth of emerging economies raises new questions 
regarding the governance of production for local and regional markets in the global South. While 
some scholars have argued that the growth of Southern markets may lead to a “race to the bottom” 
for work and employment conditions, a number of recent studies have since documented the 
introduction of Southern MSIs governing production for local markets.   
This article examines the development of Trustea as a Southern MSI governing the rights and 
conditions of Indian workers and producers supplying tea to India’s domestic market. Drawing on 
analysis of production networks (PNs), this article demonstrates the key reasons why firms, state 
and civil society actors from the global North and global South have come to share a mutual interest 
in governing tea produced for India’s domestic market. The evidence presented challenges the 
dominant assumption that Southern MSIs tend to be driven by local actors and processes and 
presents a more complex picture of the evolving relationship between actors from the global North 
and global South within the development of Southern standards.  
 
 




1. Introduction  
Exploitative labour practices and poor working conditions in developing countries remain a pressing 
social concern in an age of advanced globalisation. To better protect the rights and conditions of 
workers and producers embedded within production networks (PNs), multi-stakeholder initiatives 
(MSIs) have been introduced as a key institution of regulatory governance (Dingwerth, 2008; 
Fransen & Kolk, 2007; O’Rourke, 2006; Turcotte, Reinecke, & den Hond, 2014). In MSIs, lead firms 
cooperate with civil society organisations (CSOs) and state-based actors to address key challenges 
associated with poor working conditions within developing countries (Bartley, 2003; Bartley, 2007). 
Whilst the effectiveness of MSIs in improving conditions for workers and producers has been 
questioned extensively, their proliferation over the past two decades marks a significant 
transformation within the global governance of working conditions.   
The vast majority of MSIs govern global production networks (GPNs), in which goods and services 
produced in the global South are consumed in the global North. Therefore, in the context of North-
South trade, MSIs are understood to be an important institution governing social standards in 
developing countries (Schleifer and Sun, 2018). However, global trade flows and the geographies of 
consumption are shifting (Staritz, Gereffi and Cattaneo, 2011; Gereffi, 2014). Emerging economies 
now account for a rapidly growing proportion of global imports and the expansion of markets in 
these regions leads to new questions regarding the governance of social standards in the 
contemporary era (Nadvi, 2014; Horner and Nadvi, 2018).  
Initial assumptions regarding the growth of consumption in emerging economies were largely 
pessimistic and predicted upon a “race to the bottom” in the conditions of employment for workers 
and producers (Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2010). However, the emergence of social standards governing 
production in Southern markets has since challenged this outlook (Hospes, 2014; Schouten and 
Bitzer, 2015; Pickles, Barrientos and Knorringa, 2016; Giessen et al., 2016). Recent studies indicate 
that these Southern standards are driven by local actors who have created alternative forms of 
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governance to the export-oriented standards embedded within global production networks (GPNs). 
As such, they are predicated upon different forms of legitimacy and are seen to reflect local norms 
to a greater extent than export-oriented standards (Schouten and Bitzer, 2015). However, this 
research agenda is still at a nascent stage, with only a handful of case studies examining the actors 
and processes behind the emergence of Southern standards. There is still considerable research to 
be conducted, in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of how and why Southern MSIs 
have emerged within varied institutional environments.  
This paper seeks to address this gap through its examination of a Southern MSI designed to govern 
social standards within India’s domestic tea market. The rights and conditions of employment for tea 
workers producing for export markets have been governed by various standards for over a decade.  
Although Northern MSIs such as Rainforest Alliance, Utz Certified and Fair Trade have certified a 
considerable proportion of Indian tea exported into the EU and other OECD markets, the vast 
majority of tea produced in India is consumed within the domestic market. This trend has increased 
in recent years as demand for tea in European markets, especially, continues to decline while 
demand within the Indian market increases. The reorientation of tea production away from export 
markets to feed domestic demand has presumably affected the power of Northern actors to 
influence the governance of tea production. In addition to these regulatory challenges, the 
continued expansion of domestic consumption has also contributed to a new political economy of 
tea production, characterised by increased informality within the labour market through the rise of 
smallholder production (Neilson and Pritchard, 2011). This presumably affects the power of 
Southern (i.e. domestic) actors to govern the tea industry; particularly as smallholder production is 
not subject to national labour law. This leads to a widening of a governance gap within both the 
global production network (GPN) and the domestic production network (DPN) of Indian tea.  
The launch of Trustea is arguably a regulatory response to these spatial and temporal 
transformations within the production and trade of Indian tea. Drawing on the production network 
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(PN) literature, this paper uses the global production network (GPN) and domestic production 
network (DPN) as a guiding framework to examine the role and interests of firms, state and civil 
society actors in shaping Trustea as a Southern standard. This paper asks: Which actors and 
processes have driven the creation of Trustea as a Southern multi-stakeholder initiative?  
While contemporary literature on the governance of emerging markets examines the efforts of 
Northern actors to expand global programmes within Southern markets (Schleifer and Sun, 2018) or 
else focuses on the ways through which Southern actors seek to develop local alternatives to 
Northern standards (Bartley, 2014), the case of Trustea represents a confluence of these two, 
seemingly distinct processes. Overall, the findings problematise the assumption that Southern MSIs 
are directed first and foremost by Southern actors; instead illustrating a high degree of involvement 
by actors from the global North within the development of the multi-stakeholder initiative. 
Conceptually, the article advances the polycentric trade framework recently outlined by Horner and 
Nadvi (2018); recognising that although there are important distinctions to be made between 
different end markets, there are also important intersections which exist between the commercial 
and institutional actors who shape the governance of different end markets. The analysis illustrates 
that the embeddedness of firms, state based and civil society actors within overlapping production 
networks (i.e. both the domestic and global production networks of Indian tea) problematises the 
tendency to discuss governance in terms of ‘Northern’ versus ‘Southern’ actors. This in turn 
challenges the assumption that Southern standards are always shaped as reactive institutions in 
relation to Northern standards; and implies instead that the boundaries between North and South 
are increasingly indistinct as the members shaping Trustea transcend these categories themselves.  
The paper is structured as follows: The next section reviews the development of MSIs in the context 
of Northern and Southern markets. It establishes that while studies have begun to link the 
emergence of Southern MSIs to local actors who seek to reclaim authority from Northern MSIs, 
there is still a significant empirical gap in our understanding of how these MSIs typically emerge. 
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Section 3 illustrates how shifting end markets for Indian tea alongside structural shifts in the mode 
of production (from the formal to the informal sector) has created an environment within which 
Southern and Northern actors have developed a strategic interest in governing India’s domestic 
market. Section 4 introduces the case of Trustea and explores the ways through which firms, state-
based and civil society actors have shaped its development as a Southern MSI. The evidence 
presented contributes to contemporary debates regarding the governance of production in an era of 
polycentric trade; demonstrating that different end markets for tea does not necessarily result in 
completely separate governance arrangements.  Section 5 concludes.  
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2. The development of social standards within globalised production networks  
2.1 Governance of production under globalisation 
The vast majority of global trade is at present characterised by the fragmentation of production 
across geographically disparate regions, in which lead firms outsource key parts of production to 
suppliers (Dicken, 2015). The development of production networks spanning different continents 
was facilitated through trade liberalisation and accompanied by rapid shifts in communication 
technology. This resulted in a new international division of labour in the global economy (Frobel, 
Heinrichs and Kreye, 1978). The global production network (GPN) framework captures the multi-
scalar, multi-actor dimensions of trade in an era of advanced globalisation by examining the 
‘organised nexus of interconnected functions and operations by firms and non-firm institutions’ 
through which goods and services are produced and governed (Coe, Hess and Yeung, 2004, p. 41). It 
considers the ways through which the commercial inter-firm relations constituting a global value 
chain are themselves enveloped within broader institutional dynamics (Henderson et al., 2002; Coe, 
Dicken and Hess, 2008). Therefore, the empirical focus is on the complex inter-firm and inter-
institutional linkages that constitute the governance of fragmented production across borders.  
The rise of lead firms as key economic actors in the global economy has created new challenges and 
opportunities in relation to the governance of production within developing countries. Studies using 
the GPN framework have illustrated how the purchasing practices of lead firms can lead to the 
institutionalisation of inadequate labour and social conditions in producer countries (Barrientos and 
Kritzinger, 2004; Phillips, 2013). Additionally, the framework can be utilised to investigate the 
different ways through which firms, state-based and civil society actors create standards designed to 
ameliorate exploitative labour practices. The processes through which this broader institutional 
context impacts on the commercial (i.e. market) interactions can be understood as the 
‘embeddedness’ of production within the norms, customs and rules of particular territories (Hess, 
2004, 2008).  
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While the study of production networks has tended to examine the governance of North-South 
trade (in which production within developing countries feeds mass consumption in the global 
North), the contemporary era of trade is increasingly multi-polar; and is one in which  emerging 
markets account for a growing percentage of consumption and trade (Gereffi, 2014). These trends 
constitute a potentially significant transformation within the global economy (Guarín & Knorringa, 
2013; Knorringa & Guarin, 2015; Sinkovics, Yamin, Nadvi, & Zhang, 2014) and raise questions 
regarding the forms and mechanisms through which production is governed within Southern 
markets. The increasingly polycentric nature of global trade has prompted scholars to conceptualise 
and distinguish additional networks through which Southern and/or Northern lead firms coordinate 
production for regional and domestic markets in the South (Horner and Nadvi, 2018). Questions 
have arisen regarding the types of inter-firm linkages present between lead firms and their suppliers 
within these networks, as well as the degree to which standards are utilised by lead firms to govern 
production for these markets (Horner, 2016).   
The recent introduction of domestic and regional production networks (DPN/RPNs) into the global 
production network (GPN) literature builds a framework of analysis sensitive to multi-polar trade 
flows (Horner and Nadvi, 2018). As such, it facilitates exploration of how production networks 
oriented towards different end markets may converge or diverge in terms of their coordination and 
governance. Table 1 below illustrates the key characteristics of global, regional and domestic 
production networks as well as the ‘flow’ of trade within each network. Together, a heuristic 
framework mapping production feeding multiple end markets is constructed by accounting for 
different geographies of trade and consumption. 
Type of production network Definition and Characteristics  Direction/Flow of trade  
Global production network Global production networks are 
those where lead firms source 
from and supply to international 
markets that cross substantial 
geographical boundaries. Here, the 
term ‘global’ doesn’t necessitate 
the presence of the network 
North-South, although if GPNs are 
understood as operating across at 
least two continents then North-
North, North-South or South-South 
could also apply. This hasn’t 
tended to be the focus of GPN 
studies to date however as they 
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within every country or continent 
to meet the definition, but instead 
can refer to activities that are at 
least integrated across two or 
more countries.  
have empirically focused on North-
South trade.  
Regional production network Regional production networks 
represent a situation whereby lead 
firms are supplying markets in 
neighbouring and regional 
economies as well as sourcing 
from, and sub-contracting to, 
regional suppliers. The term 
‘region’ here applies to established 
regional markets as defined by (a) 
markets which function under 
common regulatory regimes (EU) 
(b) preferential trading rules for 
their regional members (ASEAN) 
(c) notional regional identity  
Trade could be North-North, 
North-South or South-South  
Domestic production network  Domestic value chains are those 
that are organised and led by local 
lead firms, source from national 
suppliers and feed demand in 
domestic end markets. 
As the network is contained within 
a local setting, the authors don’t 
depict a direction of trade flow. 
However, the ways in which the 
domestic production network is 
itself is connected to shifting trade 
flows occurring within regional and 
global trade flows, it is important 
to understand how the local 
market relates to these flows. For 
example, the fact that trade 
patterns may move from North-
South to domestic production 
networks in the global South could 
arguably be seen as a broader 
movement from North-South to 
South-South trade.  
Table 1 Types of Production Network (Source: adapted from Horner and Nadvi 2018, p.222) 
2.2 The emergence of multi-stakeholder initiatives  
While public regulations and legal frameworks play an important role in regulating the rights and 
conditions of workers and producers, continued evidence of weakly enforced, and in some cases 
inadequate public standards has led to a plethora of privately-governed standards in recent years 
(Cheyns, 2011; Mena and Palazzo, 2012). At present, one of the most common institutional forms 
used to govern standards within PNs is the multi-stakeholder initiative (MSI). MSIs are formed by 
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stakeholders who wish to collectively address social and/or environmental problems within 
production processes (Hughes, 2001; Fransen, 2012; Hospes, 2014). Stakeholders may include 
representatives of corporations, NGOs, trade unions, ethnic or community organisations as well as 
less frequent representation from governmental or inter-governmental organisations (Moog, Spicer 
and Böhm, 2015). Members cooperate in order to develop codes of conduct which are subsequently 
used (across a production network) in order to verify that suppliers meet the specified standards 
agreed upon by the members of the MSI (Fransen and Kolk, 2007). Key MSIs governing global trade 
include the Forestry Stewardship Council, Rainforest Alliance and the Marine Stewardship Council.  
MSIs which govern rights and conditions of wage labour and smallholder livelihoods are known as 
social standards (Pickles, Barrientos and Knorringa, 2016, p. 6). Within global production networks, 
MSIs have commonly been used to govern North-South trade flows of goods and services. Their 
introduction into GPNs has been understood as a reaction by lead firms to increased civil society and 
media exposés of exploitative social conditions of production within developing countries (Sasser et 
al., 2006). Firms have used their participation within MSIs to protect their reputation and secure 
their market position in light of these broader developments (Fuchs, Kalfagianni and Havinga, 2011; 
Barrientos, 2013; Fransen and Burgoon, 2015). Yet while concerns about reputational damage imply 
strong societal pressure to govern production, the extent to which consumers have played a leading 
role in driving the creation of private governance through ethical purchasing preferences remains a 
subject of debate (Carrigan and Attalla, 2001).  
To date, the overwhelming majority of MSIs have governed goods and services produced for 
Northern markets. The transmission of social standards through GPNs has raised important 
questions regarding the relationship between Northern standard-setters and the firms, workers and 
producers (predominantly from developing countries) who are expected to comply with these 
standards.  Studies examining North-South interactions within private governance initiatives have 
noted that MSIs governing exports to Northern markets tend to marginalise or exclude Southern 
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actors through unequal representation of interests and/or participation within the internal 
governance of the standard (Pattberg, 2006; Bitzer, Francken and Glasbergen, 2008; Dingwerth, 
2008). This has led to a domination of Northern discourses over Southern discourses within 
Northern MSIs (Cheyns, 2011; Ponte and Cheyns, 2013). The insertion of export-oriented standards 
into local institutional environments also creates a layering of additional governance ‘rules’ 
alongside pre-existing state regulations (Locke, Rissing and Pal, 2013; Amengual and Chirot, 2016). 
Therefore, the extent to which private and public forms of governance complement or compete at 
the local level has been the subject of extensive research (Locke, Rissing and Pal, 2013; Bartley, 
2014; Amengual and Chirot, 2016).  
Consequently, as a result of these territorial distinctions, the study of MSIs governing GPNs has led 
scholars to analytically distinguish actors and interests based on their geographical position; with 
most studies examining the ‘global’ actors who set standards and the ‘local’ actors who experience 
them (De Neve, 2008; Otieno and Knorringa, 2012). These binary distinctions are a product of the 
tendency for scholars of globalisation to assume that production of goods and services 
predominantly takes place within the global South for end markets in the global North.  However, 
North-South trade flows of goods and services are only one geographical constituent of globalised 
production, and as discussed above, recognition of this fact has resulted in an expansion of the 
original GPN framework to now include discussions of governance within regional and domestic PNs. 
Understanding patterns and dynamics of co-ordination and governance within these localised 
networks of production has become ever more important under a ‘new geography of trade’ (Horner 
and Nadvi, 2018, p. 208). For instance, Northern markets will soon constitute a smaller fraction of 
total global demand for many goods and services compared to the South; with emerging markets 
expected to expand from just 36% of the global share of middle class consumption in 2009 to over 
60% by 2030 (Kharas, 2010). Indeed, updated figures suggest that Asia alone could constitute 
approximately 65% of the share of the global middle class by 2030 (Kharas, 2017).  
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India’s domestic market has been transformed by the rise of the middle class; whose consumer 
habits are shaped by rising incomes, exposure to international life styles and media, access to 
information and willingness to try foreign products and services (Javalgi and Grossman, 2016). While 
rising incomes have led to higher levels of discretionary spending, recent studies suggest that 
attitudes are also changing in relation to both the quality and the ethical credentials of products 
purchased (Guarín and Knorringa, 2013). The altered preferences of emerging market consumers 
raise important questions regarding the governance of social standards in the global South; 
particularly as production networks are reoriented from global markets in order to cater for 
increases in local demand. Within these shifting dynamics, the attitudes and responses of Southern 
firms, state and civil society actors in developing new institutions of governance (including MSIs) 
becomes ever more critical to examine from a regulatory perspective. Related to this, is the question 
of whether Northern actors might also seek to shape the governance of emerging markets as we 
enter an increasingly polycentric age of global trade.  
2.3 The emergence of Southern MSIs  
New geographies of trade and consumption raise questions regarding the interests of Southern 
firms, state-based and civil society actors in governing production. This is pertinent given that shifts 
in economic and geopolitical power may encourage Southern actors to play ‘increasingly significant 
roles in shaping the new contours of globalisation’ (Horner and Nadvi, 2018, p. 208). While the 
development of Southern MSIs and other standards designed to govern production in line with 
social concerns was considered unlikely, given seemingly lower consumer activism or interest in such 
factors (Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2010), recent literature has challenged this assumption by mapping 
the emergence of Southern standards across a number of different sectors (Hospes, 2014; Schouten 
and Bitzer, 2015; Giessen et al., 2016). These studies are accompanied by findings which indicate 
that consumers in these markets are displaying awareness of social issues in addition to concerns 
regarding the quality of the goods and services they consume (Guarín and Knorringa, 2013). The 
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debate has moved on from questions of whether Southern markets will be governed by new 
standards to questions regarding how these standards are shaped and implemented.  
Studies documenting the growth of Southern standards have tended to illustrate their development 
as being linked to political struggles regarding who should govern production processes (Bartley, 
2014; Schouten and Bitzer, 2015). Southern standards are frequently seen as reactive because their 
development has been led by actors who challenge the hegemony of Northern standards through 
the creation of ‘local’ alternatives (Schouten and Bitzer, 2015). In many cases, the state plays a 
central role in these efforts. Evidence from the Chinese timber industry illustrates that the 
government created an alternative domestically-driven certification scheme, thus reducing the space 
for Northern standards (Bartley, 2014, p. 103). Likewise, in Indonesia, state actors are reclaiming 
authority from transnational certification schemes through the introduction of state-led mandatory 
schemes; challenging ‘private and transnational certification institutions in support of government-
driven international certification regimes’ (Giessen et al., 2016, p. 71). Thus, the current phase in the 
governance of production in emerging markets is characterised by Southern state actors developing 
standards and certification schemes in direct competition to Northern initiatives (Wijaya and 
Glasbergen, 2016). However, it is not only Southern actors who are doing so. Recent research by 
Foley and Havice (2018) illustrated that territorialised eco-certification schemes are emerging in the 
global North which challenge the primacy of Marine Stewardship Council in its governance of the 
global fisheries industry. Such efforts are once again supported by state actors. These multi-scalar 
tensions between the global and the local appear to characterise the development of standard 
setting both in the global North and the global South. 
Shifting geographies of trade and consumption may also lead Northern actors to exploit the 
emergence of Southern markets to expand their own governance programmes and standards.  
Evidence is emerging that this is the case, and can materialise through several different mechanisms. 
Firstly, Northern lead firms seeking to capture market share in Southern markets may transfer 
13 
 
governance practices from the GPN to regional and domestic PNs. Evidence of this has occurred in 
the case of East Africa, in which standards crossed from global into regional markets via the 
internationalisation strategies of global retailers (Pickles, Barrientos and Knorringa, 2016). Secondly, 
standard setters and sustainability programmes are also seeking to expand market share within 
emerging markets. The roll-out of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) in both the 
Chinese and Indian markets is one example of how global standards have sought to expand within 
domestic markets, with mixed uptake by local firms (Schleifer and Sun, 2018). Thirdly, civil society 
organisations such as NGOs from the global North may also seek to influence the governance of 
standards in emerging markets, as will be discussed in the case of Trustea.  
Put simply, this means that North-South/South-South production networks may not necessarily exist 
within separate commercial and institutional spaces; but instead be subject to multiple types of 
‘linkage’ which could affect the development and character of Southern standards. If this is the case, 
the presumption that Southern MSIs are always driven by local actors could and should be 
challenged.  This paper uses the case of Trustea to illustrate how the growth of emerging markets 
has altered the strategies and interests of both Northern and Southern actors in shaping the 
development of Southern MSIs, and crucially illuminates the difficulty in differentiating the 
boundaries between North and South. 
3. The Indian Tea Industry  
3.1 Case study methodology 
A case study methodology (eg. Yin 2009; Robson and McCartan 2016) was used to generate 
insightful data capturing the development of a new Southern MSI governing the production of tea 
for India’s domestic market. Fieldwork was undertaken in the UK, the Netherlands and India 
(primarily Delhi, Bangalore and Kolkata) between 2014-2016; during which in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with sixty-nine individuals from lead firms, supplier firms, government 
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bodies and civil society actors (including trade unions). Interviewees were selected based on their 
involvement in the governance of tea produced for the GPN and/or DPN. As such, respondents 
linked to the development of Trustea were interviewed alongside a wider selection of relevant 
stakeholders. Key questions raised in the interviews facilitated the identification of the actors and 
drivers behind Trustea’s development, the influence of broader shifts in the political economy of tea 
production on the governance of the sector, as well as relations and dynamics present between 
Trustea and the wider institutional environment. Interviews were supplemented by the use of 
secondary data sources including trade data and reports produced by companies, government and 
civil society organisations involved in the governance of standards within the Indian and global tea 
sectors. 
3.2 From uni-directional to polycentric: shifting markets for Indian tea  
India is one of the largest producers of tea globally. Tea was first introduced into the Indian market 
as a colonial cash crop under British occupation (Neilson and Pritchard, 2011). The use of indentured 
workers in the tea plantations and the thousands of deaths of ‘tea coolies’ during the colonial period 
through severe exploitation marks a dark period in the history of the industry (Sengupta 2009). 
Initially, all Indian tea was cultivated for export. However, a number of exogenous economic factors 
(most notably the Great Depression) led both British and Indian companies to foster a domestic 
market for tea in the first half of the twentieth century; albeit with limited success (Lutgendorf, 
2012). During the 1960s, the introduction of new technologies within the processing of tea led to a 
huge increase in the availability of affordable tea in the local market. This drove a significant growth 
in domestic consumption (aided through extensive marketing campaigns), which has continued to 
the present day (Lutgendorf, 2012). In recent years, population growth, urbanisation and rising 
incomes have further boosted demand for tea in emerging economies, including India (FAO 2015). In 
the period 1991-2010, the volume of tea consumed in India has risen from 500 million kg to over 800 
million kg (see Figure 1) and while per capita consumption is still relatively low compared to other 
countries, the overall increase in demand has meant that the majority of the tea produced in India 
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has fed domestic (as opposed to export) markets; a trend which has continued to increase over the 
past few decades (Arya 2013). As a result, India has recently overtaken China as the world’s largest 
consumer of black tea, with over one million tonnes of tea consumed nationally in 2015 (FA0, 2015). 
In addition, the increased preference for packaged (as opposed to loose leaf) tea is indicative of 
shifting consumer preferences within India’s domestic tea market (Kadavil, 2007). The growth in 
sales of packaged, branded teas has been linked to increased concerns regarding the quality of tea, 
as consumers reportedly see packaged teas as more trustworthy than loose-leaf teas (Tea Board 
2018).  
 
Figure 1 Changing Domestic Demand for Indian Tea (Volume M Kg) 1991-2010 (Source: Tea Board of India 2013) 
The growth of the domestic market, accompanied by shifting consumer attitudes, has a number of 
significant implications for actors and institutions involved in the regulation and governance of 
Indian and global tea production. In terms of governance, these trends would imply a stronger 
interest on the part of firms, NGOs and state actors to shape standards and regulations for the 
domestic, as well as the global tea market. Indeed, any public or private standards governing labour 
and social conditions within the Indian tea sector at the national scale, and/or for the domestic 
market would govern the majority of Indian tea production and would protect higher numbers of 
workers and producers as compared to export-oriented standards.  
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While demand for black tea within India’s domestic market continues to grow, global trends indicate 
that EU/OECD markets for black tea are contracting in size. During the period 2012-2015, the total 
value of exports of Indian tea to the UK market fell by 33.6%, with similar contractions occurring 
within the German and Australian markets (UN Comtrade 2015). The decline in tea consumption 
within these markets correlates to the increased popularity of coffee (Mintel, 2015). However, 
despite an overall decline in demand in Northern markets, there is evidence from trade data that 
non-OECD markets are importing ever-greater quantities of Indian tea. This has occurred most 
notably in Russia where Indian tea imports have significantly increased in the past decade (see 
Figure 2 below).   
 
 
Figure 2 Changing Imports of Indian Tea 2006-2015 (Source: UN Comtrade) 
Overall, these trends have important implications for the governance of Indian tea under shifting 
end markets. This is due to the fact that there is a higher density of standards governing EU and 
OECD markets, with a tendency for fewer regulatory standards present within non-OECD markets in 
the South.  




The political economy of tea production in India has not only been affected by shifting trade flows, 
but also by changes in the modes of production. Tradiitonally, tea was cultivated on plantation 
estates. These tend to be relatively large in scale at 200 hectares or above (Kadavil, 2007). However, 
smallholder based production has risen dramatically over recent decades in response to a number of 
structural constraints within the Indian tea industry (Hayami and Damodaran, 2004). While 
smallholders, who cultivate less than 25 acres (or 10.12 hectares) accounted for just 7% of 
production in 1991, by 2013 they were responsible for over 31% of  total production (see Table 2). 
More recent figures place the percentage of tea production emanating from smallholders at 44% 
(Bolton 2018).   
Year Small growers Plantation estates 
1991 7% 93% 
2001 24% 76% 
2011 28.39% 71.61% 
2012 32.24% 67.76% 
2013 31.23% 68.77% 
Table 2 Percentage of tea production (by volume) originating from smallholders and plantation estates (Tea Board of 
India 2013) 
While tea cultivated on the plantations tends to be processed on site in the estate factories, tea 
produced by smallholders is often transported to nearby bought leaf factories (Neilson and 
Pritchard, 2011). Here, tea leaves are processed and sold on to buyers (through direct sale) or via 
auction centres (Kadavil, 2007). These differences have implications for the traceability of tea, with 
the latter affording lead firms’ greater levels of traceability than the former. The distinct typology of 
tea production in terms of size of holding and ownership structures are illustrated in Table 3 below.  
 
Type Size  Ownership  Processing Facilities 




None- leaf is 
transported to 
bought leaf factory 
Small gardens <200 hectares  Single proprietor or 
partnership firms  
Processing facilities 
may be on site, or 
else tea would be 
processed offsite (at 
a bought leaf factory)  
Large Estates  >200 hectares Large Companies, Limited 
Liability Companies or 





Table 3 Ownership structures in the Indian tea industry (Source: Kadavil 2007) 
Such distinctions are important when considering the co-ordination of production for global versus 
domestic production networks. Tea produced for GPNs originates from the larger tea gardens and 
estates whereas tea sourced for the DPN originates from both the large estates, small gardens and 
smallholder producers. Therefore, there are notable differences in the modes of production which 
feed global versus local markets1.  
 
3.3 Implications of changing political economy for governance  
 
In the GPN, tea is sourced solely from plantation estates. The two largest lead firms coordinating the 
GPN (by global market share) are the Anglo-Dutch conglomerate Unilever and Tetley, owned by the 
Indian conglomerate Tata. These two firms together control 16% of the global tea market (Potts et al 
2014). At the local scale of the GPN, the Plantation Labour Act (1948) governs the rights and 
conditions of workers on the plantations (Neilson and Pritchard, 2011; Bhattacharya, 2015). Thus tea 
estates and tea gardens are very much part of the formal and publicly regulated economy. However, 
tea exports into EU and OECD markets are also governed by a number of private standards within 
the GPN. These are utilised by the lead firms to verify that tea sourced from producer countries 
meets particular product and process standards. Rainforest Alliance is the MSI chosen by Unilever 
and Tetley, as well as their major competitors to certify tea sold in Northern markets is in 
conformance with social standards. Given the market position of these global firms, RA has become 
the world’s largest certifier of tea and as of 2018 had certified 19.9% of the world’s tea supply 
(Rainforest Alliance 2018).  
 
In the DPN, tea is sourced from plantation estates and smallholders. The two largest firms 
coordinating the DPN are Unilever’s subsidiary firm Hindustan Unilever, alongside Tata Global 
 
1 Whilst there appears to be a firm separation between the modes of production within the GPN and the DPN, 
there is increased evidence to suggest that plantation estates are outsourcing production to out-growers 
located in proximity to the estate factories.   
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Beverages (which acquired Tetley in 2005).  Together, these two local lead firms control 51% of the 
packed tea market in India (Neilson and Pritchard, 2011).  In essence, this means that the GPN and 
DPN are commercially linked because the GPN and the DPN are coordinated by the same companies 
to a large extent.  While plantations in the DPN are subject to the regulations contained in the 
Plantation Labour Act, the smallholder segment of production is neither regulated by national labour 
law nor by private standards (prior to the creation of Trustea). Given the largely unregulated nature 
of smallholder production, smallholders are part of the informal economy; existing outside the 
purview of public regulations. Historically, lead firms had not sought to align private governance 
practices across the GPN and DPN. However, the launch of Trustea in 2013 appears to mark a change 
in their approach to the governance of emerging markets. The following section now turns to 
examine the ways through which firms, state-based and civil society actors positioned within the 
GPN and/or the DPN came to shape Trustea’s development.  
 
4. The creation of a Southern MSI  
 
4.1 The launch of Trustea 
 
In July 2013, Hindustan Unilever, Tata Global Beverages and the Tea Board of India announced the 
launch of Trustea (www.trustea.org); a new standard designed to govern social conditions of tea 
produced for India’s domestic tea market. Trustea is a code of conduct comprised of eleven 
chapters, each pertaining to different areas of regulation. This includes not only social chapters 
(labour standards in plantations and small tea gardens, worker protection and welfare) but also 
environmental chapters (pesticides, waste disposal and water management) and food safety 
standards. Trustea is funded by Hindustan Unilever (HUL), Tata Global Beverages (TGB) and IDH 
(Initiatief Duurzame Handel). There are three tiers of representation within the internal structure of 
Trustea, as illustrated in Figure 3. The Funders Steering Committee consists of the two largest 
domestic lead firms and the Dutch development agency IDH.  The Programme Committee consists of 
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key advisors and implementers within the development of Trustea, along with the funders. The 
Advisory Committee constitutes a more inclusive forum through which external stakeholders are 
invited to comment on Trustea’s development.   
Although ostensibly Trustea is a Southern MSI, Trustea’s creation appears to be partially driven by 
organisations that have hitherto played a central role in the governance of tea exports into EU and 
OECD markets. Hindustan Unilever is the subsidiary firm of the global lead firm Unilever, and as 
examined below, the interest of the company in developing Trustea was partially driven by targets 
set by the global headquarters of the firm. In addition, as illustrated in Figure 3, other supporting 
organisations include IDH and Solidaridad; both of which are Dutch organisations involved in the 
creation and facilitation of public-private partnerships for development. However, the involvement 
of local state-based agencies such as the Tea Board of India demonstrates that Trustea is at least 
partially directed by local interests, and indeed both Hindustan Unilever and Tata Global Beverages 
can be regarded as lead firms in both the global and domestic tea markets. It is this confluence of 
Northern and Southern interests as embodied within these organisations which forms the central 




Figure 3 Membership of Trustea (Source: Trustea Website) 
Table 4 illustrates the linkages present between firms, state-based and civil society actors across the 
GPN and DPN. It demonstrates two key points in relation to the governance of Trustea. Firstly, its 
development has been partly shaped by global actors who have also been instrumental in the 
development of export standards in the Indian tea sector. Secondly, these actors appear to have 
organisational linkages to actors governing the DPN of Indian tea production. The linkages are 
indicated in the diagram through the use of arrows.  
Actor Domestic Production Network Global Production Network  
Private (Lead Firm) Hindustan Unilever (2013) 
Tata Global Beverages (2014)  
Unilever (2013) 
Tetleys (Tata) (2014) 
Civil society (NGO) Solidaridad India (2013)  Solidaridad (2013) 
Rainforest Alliance (2013) 
Utz Certified (2013) 
Ethical Tea Partnership (2012-
2013) 






Table 4 Key members of Trustea and their position across the DPN and the GPN (Source: Author) 
The following section illustrates how these ‘linkages’ influenced the ability for Northern and 
Southern actors to shape the development of Trustea. It examines the role of firms, state-based and 
civil society actors in shaping the MSI at the global and local scales.  
4.2 Firms  
 
Unilever is the largest global buyer of tea (Potts et al., 2014) and its interest in governing production 
across producer countries has been an important driver of Trustea’s development. The multi-
national firm sells fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) across 190 countries, reporting an annual 
turnover of €52.7 billion in 2016 (Unilever 2016). Recent estimates state that Unilever is responsible 
for buying around 12% of the tea produced globally (by volume), whilst its two major competitors 
(Tata Global Beverages and Twinings) are responsible for purchasing 4% and 3% of the total tea 
available on the global market respectively (Potts et al., 2014). As such, Unilever is the dominant 
lead firm and its branded teas are sold in both developed and emerging markets in the global North 
and South. Unilever’s ability to capture emerging markets has depended in part on foreign direct 
investment. Retaining a majority share in domestic companies within Southern markets has enabled 
Unilever to expand their presence in emerging economies. By 2012, over 55% of the company’s total 
footprint (for all products) was held within emerging markets, with a projection of 75% of overall 
profits to come from emerging markets by 2020 (Unilever, 2015). These projections have led 
Unilever to strategically pursue expansion within these markets, selling off well-known brands within 
advanced markets whilst simultaneously focusing their expansion within Southern markets. As such, 
Unilever is one example of a global lead firm which is adapting to the changing geographies of 
consumption in an era of polycentric trade.  
In the tea sector, Unilever was the first lead firm to introduce MSIs to govern social standards within 
GPNs. In 2007, Unilever announced that all tea the company sold in EU markets would be certified 
using Rainforest Alliance. However, given that Indian tea exports into Northern markets constituted 
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a small percentage of the total tea produced; these standards only governed a fraction of India’s 
overall tea production (Neilson & Pritchard 2011). Nevertheless, Unilever experienced a number of 
commercial benefits following the introduction of standards within the GPN, including competitive 
gains derived from increased market share. For example, the launch of RA certified tea in Australia 
saw the market share of Unilever’s Lipton brand rise from 24.2% to 25.8% in just one year 
(Henderson and Nellemann, 2012).  
While initial engagement with social standards focused on Northern markets (i.e. EU and OECD 
markets) the Unilever Sustainable Living Plan (USLP) launched in 2010 stipulated that raw materials 
sourced by the firm must be sustainably produced by 2020 across all markets in which they operated 
(Unilever 2015). The approach marked a transition from a GPN-focused system of certification to 
additionally include the governance of regional and domestic production networks. However, in 
order to achieve this, Unilever had to align governance practices across its various subsidiaries. In 
India, this necessitated standards coordination with the local subsidiary firm Hindustan Unilever. 
Hindustan Unilever (HUL) is India’s largest fast-moving consumer goods corporation; owning 40 
factories and employing ~22,000 people in India. In 2013, it had an annual turnover of €3.8 billion 
(Unilever 2013). Whereas Unilever procures tea from East Africa and Asia for export (excluding 
domestic market-oriented production from India) from its central tea buying offices, Hindustan 
Unilever is responsible for buying tea for the local Indian market through a separate local tea-buying 
department. This constitutes a domestic production network in which Hindustan Unilever operates 
as a local lead firm and is responsible for the procurement of tea for the domestic market.  
It is this intersection between Unilever and Hindustan Unilever in which an initial attempt to link 
governance across the GPN and DPN occurred. Unilever initially attempted to expand Rainforest 
Alliance certification into Southern markets; thus exhibiting convergence of governance practices 
regardless of the location of end markets. However, in the case of India there were irreconcilable 
differences between Rainforest Alliance’s code of conduct and Indian labour law. Indian labour law 
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stipulates that children from the age of fourteen are allowed to work in non-hazardous industries. 
However, Rainforest Alliance, through its collaboration with the Sustainable Agriculture Network 
(SAN), stipulates that the minimum age for labour is fifteen. While export-oriented MSIs were able 
to implement more stringent standards, there was an understanding that asking suppliers to the 
domestic market to comply with Rainforest Alliance’s code would be unrealistic given the stark 
differences in product and process standards which existed. Rainforest Alliance also faced difficulty 
in engaging with the small tea growers, having only ever certified Indian tea plantations supplying 
Northern end markets. Given that smallholders represented a growing percentage of production for 
the domestic market and yet remained highly fragmented, these barriers were significant obstacles 
for Rainforest Alliance. This prevented a standardised approach to certification across markets.  
Despite initial attempts to converge standards across the GPN to the DPN, it became apparent that a 
continuation of Unilever’s partnership with RA could not be easily replicated within the institutional 
confines of the domestic production network. Unilever’s realisation that a ‘tea specific, Indian 
specific code’ would be needed for the domestic market led the company to explore the feasibility of 
developing a new tea standard geared for the domestic Indian market, with Hindustan Unilever 
leading these efforts. However, as can be seen in Figure 3, Rainforest Alliance were invited to be a 
participant of the Trustea Programme Committee; and as a result, some of the content of Trustea’s 
code of conduct is lifted directly from Rainforest Alliance’s tea code.   
4.3 State based actors  
The Tea Board of India operates as a quasi-autonomous body under the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, Government of India. Initially created as a state-centred producer marketing board, it has 
authority with respect to the authorising, registering and licensing of all industrial activities within 
the tea sector (Neilson & Pritchard, 2011). It has been described on Trustea’s website and marketing 
materials as its ‘champion’ and is appointed as both the Chairman of the Programme Committee and 
Advisory Committee. The Tea Board’s upkeep is maintained through a tax on tea producers (Neilson 
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and Pritchard, 2011). The original purpose of the organisation was the promotion of tea within both 
foreign and domestic markets under British colonialism. Since Independence, the Tea Board has 
maintained its role as a marketing board as well as a regulator of the sector.  
 
The rapid growth of smallholder production in India in recent years has presented a dilemma for the 
Tea Board. On the one hand, smallholders need to be supported in order to meet future domestic 
demand as without them India would become a ‘net importer of tea’ (Tea Board of India 2013). 
However, the ungoverned nature of smallholder production has led to reputational problems 
regarding the quality and safety standards of the tea being produced. It is in this context that the Tea 
Board announced the formation of a Small Tea Growers Directorate in 2012; a division of the 
organisation created with the sole purpose of supporting the smallholder segment of production. 
However, a 2013 campaign by an Indian NGO highlighted the misapplication of pesticides by tea 
smallholdings, which in turn breached national food safety standards. The research conducted also 
highlighted the use of illegal chemicals within the smallholder sector, which angered local consumers 
and is alleged to have resulted in increased imports of tea from other producer countries 
(Greenpeace 2013). The Tea Board of India initially responded to the NGO campaign by announcing 
the establishment of a Plant Protection Code (PPC). This code was designed to tackle the 
unregulated use of pesticides (including the use of illegal substances) in the tea industry. However, 
local NGOs criticised the PPC as a form of self-regulation which would be inadequate at tackling the 
systemic problems facing small tea growers.  
 
Meanwhile, the institutional environment for the support of MSIs governing production was 
evolving in Northern markets. State-based actors in the Netherlands had come to play a key role in 
facilitating the development of MSIs and supporting their subsequent proliferation within producer 
countries. The formation of the publicly-funded body IDH (Initiatief Duurzame Handel) in 2008 
allowed the Dutch Government to co-finance commodity programmes with the private sector and to 
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facilitate public-private partnerships for development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 
2014)2. Its creation can be seen as part of a wider transition in thinking whereby private sector 
engagement became an increasingly central element of Dutch development cooperation policy 
(OECD 2016). IDH operates as an MSI comprised of private companies, non-governmental 
organisations, trade unions and the Dutch Government and addresses key sustainability issues (both 
social and environmental) within supply chains across a variety of different sectors (tea, cocoa, 
coffee, flowers, and cotton) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2014).  
 
The tea sector is one of the key areas IDH is focused on. IDH’s support for advancing a sustainable 
tea sector began through its Tea Improvement Programme (TIP). The initial focus was on the GPN 
wherein the TIP facilitated an expansion of Utz Certified certification to producers exporting into 
European markets. However, some NGO stakeholders involved felt that the promotion of standards 
such as Utz Certified was not effective in reaching the more problematic (socially and 
environmentally speaking) parts of the production network. This related specifically to those 
producers who were supplying domestic (and not export) markets (Solidaridad 2011). Following this 
criticism, and realising the developmental potential of certifying production in Southern markets, 
IDH decided to begin funding standards governing production within DPNs. Indonesia was the first 
country through which the TIP sought to develop a domestic tea standard in 2012 (known as Teh 
Lestari). There was clear commercial support for the development of such programmes, as shortly 
afterwards Unilever approached IDH to request technical and financial support for the development 
of a new domestic tea standard in India. Due to IDH’s policy of fostering ‘pre-competitive 
partnerships’ on sustainability, IDH requested that Unilever partner with another firm in order to 
develop a code of conduct for India’s domestic production network. Consequently, Unilever reached 
out to Tata Global Beverages (TGB), its leading competitor in both global and domestic markets for 
 
2 In the period 2008-2013, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs committed EUR 123 million in official development 
assistance (ODA) to build and run IDH. 
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tea and following a lengthy series of negotiations, Tata agreed to join Trustea one year into the 
programme.  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, the evidence illustrates that state-based actors in the global North played a key 
role in the development of Trustea as a Southern MSI. State support for Trustea at the local scale 
was also shared by the Tea Board of India who agreed to join the MSI as the ‘champion’ of Trustea. 
This resulted in the politicisation of Trustea as the Union Minister of Commerce and Industry claimed 
that it was the government who had created the standard in response to public concerns regarding 
the safety of Indian tea consumption. Although the Tea Board makes no financial contribution, there 
are mutual benefits which have arisen from its participation within Trustea. The Tea Board’s 
membership has legitimised Trustea as a national standard which allows the MSI to claim it has been 
developed by local actors and interests. Furthermore, Trustea’s incorporation of the Plant Protection 
Code (a Tea Board initiative) has improved the performance of the programme; particularly in 
relation to the smallholder sector. This underlines the commonality of interests in developing a 
domestic tea standard from state-based actors present within the GPN and the DPN.   
4.4 NGOs  
Solidaridad Asia is the primary NGO partner responsible for the implementation of Trustea.  
Solidaridad Asia is a newly formed NGO based in Delhi. It was created in 2010 as a result of the 
internal restructuring of the Dutch NGO Solidaridad, through which the organisation transitioned 
from a single NGO based out of Utrecht in the Netherlands into a series of national NGOs based in 
developing countries. Prior to this transformation, Solidaridad had played an important role in 
shaping the development of standards within the GPNs of global lead firms across many different 
sectors and was instrumental in the creation of Utz Certified as an MSI. Solidaridad has also 
supported the mainstreaming of other standards within European markets and has been particularly 
strong on supporting producers to meet certification through the provision of training programmes. 
As the growth of public-private partnerships emerged as a key characteristic of contemporary Dutch 
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development cooperation, Solidaridad has partnered with IDH and European lead firms in order to 
help create and implement sustainability programmes and standards within GPNs.  
The creation of Solidaridad Asia allowed the NGO to gain a foothold in emerging markets. This in 
turn has facilitated the creation of new roundtables, standards and sustainability initiatives within 
South and South-East Asia. For the Indian tea industry, the creation of Solidaridad Asia has been 
particularly important given that the Regional Director had previously been an active member of 
Indian civil society; bringing in ‘decades of knowledge’ from previous work on standards in the 
Indian tea sector (Solidaridad 2011: 4). As plans to create a new standard for the Indian market 
developed, Solidaridad Asia was approached by Unilever and asked to develop a template for 
Trustea (which at that time was referred to as ‘SustainabiliTEA’). The local knowledge and expertise 
within Solidaridad’s Asian office allowed the members of the MSI to fully realise the commercial and 
institutional complexities of tea produced for the domestic market. Indeed, the majority of 
employees are Indian nationals and the NGO highlights the fact that solutions pioneered by 
Solidaridad are locally-led.  Solidaridad Asia worked closely with the Head of Sustainability at 
Hindustan Unilever to create a code which reflected the realities of production for the local tea 
market. As such, Solidaridad Asia has led Solidaridad’s engagement in Trustea from a local 
perspective, drawing on previous experiences within the sector.  
The case of Solidaridad illustrates that NGOs have gone beyond the formation of strategic North-
South alliances with local civil society partners to improve social standards. The growth of emerging 
markets and the strengthened case for developing local standards led Solidaridad to radically alter 
their organisational structure through the creation of regional centres in the global South. They 
relinquished their position and identity as a Dutch NGO to become a series of local NGOs within Asia, 
Africa and Latin America; connected through the identity of a common global policy space, and 
through their ability to attract Dutch funding. This process of regionalisation has become a central 
mechanism for Solidaridad to ensure their continued relevance in an era of polycentric trade. 
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5. Conclusion: The development of Southern standards in an era of polycentric trade 
Changing geographies of trade and consumption, including the expansion of markets in emerging 
economies, raises important questions regarding the future direction of governance within 
production networks. While the proliferation of social standards for exports has been well 
documented, scholars had previously argued that the growth of consumption in the global South 
would likely lead to a “race to the bottom” for conditions of employment (Kaplinsky and Farooki, 
2010). This was due to empirical evidence of poor enforcement of labour law; coupled with low 
capacity on the part of NGOs and other civil society members to push the private sector to develop 
new standards.   
 
However, the recent introduction of Southern MSIs into domestic markets challenges these earlier 
claims and highlights the interest of firms, NGOs and state actors in creating new standards to 
regulate the social conditions of production within Southern markets. Whilst the impact of the 
introduction of Southern MSIs remains to be seen, their emergence certainly challenges earlier 
claims that local actors would not seek to create new forms of governance as a response to the 
changing characteristics of the market.  
 
By analysing the case of Trustea, this paper illustrated that Southern MSIs are not always shaped 
exclusively by domestic or Southern factors, but may also be influenced by production network 
actors from other territories and scales. By illustrating the influence of polycentric trade (whereby 
actors are simultaneously participating in different networks oriented towards different end 
markets), this case analysis of Trustea has highlighted the role played by both Southern and 
Northern actors in the development of Southern standards.  The case of Trustea illuminates the 
difficulty in analysing the development of MSIs in relation to the binary categories of North and 
South and instead illustrates the complex ways through which firms, state and civil society actors 
have transcended these boundaries. Figure 4 offers a visual representation of how these actors have 
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shaped the commercial and institutional dynamics of the GPN and the DPN through organisational 
linkages bridging the local and global tea markets.  
 
Figure 4 Commercial and Institutional Linkages across the GPN and DPN (Source: Author's Construction) 
 
The origins of Trustea’s development are linked to a global agenda to scale up pre-existing standards 
within Southern markets, as illustrated in other empirical cases (Schleifer and Sun, 2018). However, 
there are also some important differences. The original impetus for the development of a domestic 
tea standard was driven by Unilever’s interest in certifying all markets in which it operated. This was 
to be achieved through the introduction of a global standard (i.e. Rainforest Alliance) into the local 
market. However, the case of goes beyond earlier findings by demonstrating that when 
insurmountable institutional differences are encountered, windows of opportunity to develop new, 
locally-embedded standards can emerge as a result of organisational linkages across multiple 
production networks. Given that Hindustan Unilever and Tata Global Beverages operated as 
domestic lead firms within the Indian tea market, they were well placed to cooperate with the Tea 
Board to create a ‘national’ tea standard to govern the sector. The subsequent incorporation of local 
initiatives previously led by state agencies (which facilitated the integration of local norms and rules 
into Trustea’s code of conduct) shaped Trustea’s discursive position as a locally-owned and managed 
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standard. In this respect, Trustea partially depended on differing sources of legitimacy as compared 
to Northern standards (Schouten and Bitzer 2015) and so Trustea emerged at the nexus of North and 
South; global and local.  
 
The intersections between actors from the global North and global South within the shaping of 
Trustea challenges the assumption that Southern MSIs are being first and foremost shaped by 
Southern actors. For while Southern standards are generally understood as representing a 
‘reassertion’ of public authority in the field of regulatory governance (Wijaya and Glasbergen, 2016), 
the case of Trustea indicates that local state agencies played a secondary role within its 
development, while firms and NGOs (linked organisationally across the GPN and the DPN) led the 
design and implementation of the MSI. The findings urge caution in assuming that the development 
of local standards governing domestic markets in the global South are necessarily separated from 
the actors and processes which have driven the development of standards for exports to Northern 
markets.   
 
Analytically, the article has shown that this particular confluence of actors and interests was brought 
about as a result of the joint embeddedness of Trustea’s core members within the GPN and the DPN 
of Indian tea production. This phenomenon occurred due to the complex organisational inter-
linkages present within the core members of the MSI; whereby lead firms and civil society 
organisations emerged as ‘hybrid’ actors in an era of polycentric trade. These findings contribute to 
the current debate on the governance of production in an era of polycentric trade by demonstrating 
that the existence of different end markets for goods and services does not necessarily lead to the 
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